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Abstract 
 
We make choices to achieve an objective. The objective is defined by an 
individual’s preferences.  Subject to constraints, the objective is approached or 
achieved. Is this a good characterization of life?  To answer this question we 
weaken one of the most basic assumptions of economics:  individuals know their 
preferences.  Instead we assume that an individual’s preferences are shaped and 
reshaped by his environment, experiences, expectations, and by exogenous events.  
In this model of individual self-discovery, preferences emerge, evolve, and 
change.  These redefinitions change the future course of the individual’s life and 
reinterpret his past.  They characterize a life lived. 
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1 Introduction 
We make choices to achieve an objective.  To be able to formulate these choices, 
economic analysis usually begins with a presumption of knowledge, knowledge of 
one’s preferences, of the distribution of the states of nature, of the constraints 
faced, of one’s identity, of current and future prices – actual or expected, of 
computational constraints on knowledge, of how to learn and the (expected) costs 
and benefits of so doing, of how one compares with one’s peers, of society and 
one’s place therein, of institutions, of who, what, where and why one is who one 
is.  It is this presumption of knowledge that allows us to make choices and to 
know, at least in expectation, the fruit these choices will bear.  The benefit of this 
to the researcher is straightforward:  (economic) behaviour can be interpreted and 
explained and satisfaction quantified.   
Two questions arise.  Does this presumption of knowledge well-characterize the 
circumstances in which decisions are made and the outcome of those decisions for 
an individual’s life?  Does it matter?  To attempt to answer these questions in this 
paper we examine an alternative presumption, that of lack of prior, verifiable, or 
immutable knowledge.  Thus an individual is initially, from his own perspective, a 
blank slate.    His identity, a composite of many distinct yet interdependent 
identities, which is a manifestation of his preferences, is not given but is shaped 
and reshaped by his environment, his experiences, his expectations, and by 
exogenous events interacting with and revealing or obscuring his essence.  His 
essence is given.  It defines who he can be not who he will be.  It is not known nor 
fully knowable and can only be discovered by living.  What an individual 
discovers is only partial since those discoveries are mediated through his 
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environment which is defined by family, peers, community, country, region, 
ethnic group, legal and economic institutions; his experiences which can be 
planned to achieve a purpose or unplanned as a result of pure chance; his 
expectations of the future, both those based on objective evidence and those on 
unfounded hopes and dreams; and through events, those that can be anticipated 
and which can be characterized by a probability distribution and those that cannot 
be anticipated and which cannot be so characterized but which can change his 
environment, cause him to reinterpret his experiences, shatter his expectations, 
reveal heretofore undiscovered aspects of his essence and modify his perception 
of who he is.   
When an individual discerns what he believes to be his composite identity and all 
its component identities, his preferences, he then aspires to attain the ideal or 
archetypal identity which is defined in the context of his history:  his environment, 
his experiences and his expectations and the events that have formed him.  
Identities can evolve or atrophy and new identities can emerge.  Thus, an 
individual’s current identity (preferences) may not be his future identity 
(preferences).  The future identity he expects, hopes and aspires to have may not 
be the one he will have or, indeed, can have.  The individual faced with his own 
complex and mutable make up as he understands it and his specific history 
balances the many aspects of his current composite identity and his expected and 
hoped for future composite identity both by actions taken, experiences and skills 
gained, and identity ideals aspired to.  The individual’s environment may 
constrain the experiences he has or is likely to have.  It also is likely to constrain 
the set of ideal identities which he perceives.  However, events can cause a 
structural break, destroying what had been, revealing different components of his 
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essence, placing the individual in a new environment, opening him to new 
experiences, changing his expectations, thereby putting him on a new path with a 
new composite identity but with his same, if reinterpreted, life.   
To describe this process of preference discernment we draw on a number of 
literatures in economics which are briefly reviewed in section II.  The model is 
developed in section III.  Implications of the model for economic analysis are 
discussed in section IV.  Section V concludes.   
2    Identity and Preference Formation   
2.1 Identity 
An individual in economics is generally represented by a single preference 
ordering, a single identity, that is fixed through time.  Individuals pursue their own 
self-interest.  What others think, societal norms of behaviour, moral imperatives, 
have no role unless they increase the individual’s atomistic well-being.   Sen 
(1977) challenged this.  Sen (1985, 2002) argues that individual decision making 
cannot be characterized by optimizing self interest.  Individuals have goals and 
make choices that are inconsistent with self interest and are, instead, committed to 
particular social behaviours either to obtain a social goal, which may come at a 
personal cost while benefiting society, or to maintain the social structure within 
which they live by holding to societal behavioural norms (Sen 1997).  He also 
argues that individuals do not have a single preference ordering but, rather, have 
multiple preference orderings, one for each identity, over a given set of choices.  
The individual then must have a preference ordering over the multiple orderings, 
but this ordering may not be complete.  This incomplete ordering can lead to 
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individuals exhibiting time inconsistent behaviours, as which ordering takes 
precedence at a moment in time may depend on any number of factors.     
 Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2005) brought the concept of identity and 
preferences based on achieving an assigned social identity into mainstream 
economics.  They maintain the concept of a single preference ordering and while 
broadening the analysis to include the individual’s social setting, how he is placed 
therein (by assignment rather than choice), and how he behaves to both be what 
society expects him to be and to minimize the cognitive dissonance of defying 
social expectations.  Their models are closely related to models of socially 
referenced preferences, which also assume a single preference ordering and self-
interested behaviour, such as Veblen (1934), Duesenberry (1949), Easterlin 
(1974), Frank (1985), and Clark and Oswald (1998), among others.  In Akerlof 
and Kranton’s analyses, in contrast to the socially referenced preference literature, 
individuals try to obtain an assigned ideal identity rather than assessing their 
happiness relative to others in their chosen reference group.   
Kirman and Teschl (2004, 2006), Teschl (2006) and Horst, Kirman and Teschl 
(2006) acknowledge the strengths and weaknesses of standard economic theory.  
The simple picture of an agent’s identity at each moment in time is given by a 
fixed preference ordering.  This ordering and the agent’s attempt to maximize his 
utility subject to specific constraints describe what the agent is.  Introducing 
preferences for his social identity expands rather than changes this simple view of 
a global and unchanging preference ordering, by adding to the description of the 
economic agent’s identity more information as to where the agent is situated 
within a social space.  Individuals change by choosing to belong to social groups 
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in order to become who they want to be and to realize their, not necessarily fixed, 
self-image.  By choosing their social groups, people are consciously changing 
what and where they are right now, thus changing their preference ordering, to 
become who they would like to be in the future.  The social group is a mechanism 
for people to acquire those characteristics they would like to have now.  This 
process may be repeated in the future and new social groups chosen to meet new 
goals.  This conscious and continuous change leads to incomplete preference 
orderings. 
Kirman and his colleagues model how an individual defines himself by choosing 
to change through time.  That individual remains identifiable as a unique 
individual across change, as required by Davis’s (2006) conception of the 
individual.  This is in contrast to Parfitt (1971) who characterizes the individual as 
a sequence of selves.  Bazin and Ballet (2006) can be considered a formalization 
of Parfitt’s framework.  They characterize the individual as having multiple selves 
simultaneously, like multiple but independent identities.  Their model also 
suggests that the individual’s preference ordering will not be complete.   
Similar in emphasis are Schelling’s (1985) analysis of multiple selves and 
Loewenstein’s (2000) recognition of our inability to resist visceral urges.  Both 
Schelling and Loewenstein suggest these visceral factors cause us to behave in a 
manner inconsistent with our true (or dominant) preferences, while only Schelling 
contends that individuals have multiple selves, each with his own preference 
ordering.  Loewenstein, in contrast, contends that decisions are made by a single 
self with a single preference ordering, but effects of (visceral) states cause our 
lower order or primitive (irrational) nature to overwhelm our higher order 
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(rational) nature when decisions are made under their influence.  In their models 
an individual’s identity (identities) is (are) fixed and known, the dilemma is how 
to ensure the true self takes the decisions and that visceral urges are minimized. 
These models all lead to behaviours that are inconsistent with those predicted by 
the atomistic, self-interested agent model which has formed the backbone of 
economic analysis.  Behaviour that appears to be time inconsistent is the norm.  
Society imposes behavioural constraints.  The good of the collective may 
dominate the good of the individual.  Interpersonal comparisons explicitly or 
implicitly are indicators of individual wellbeing.  The self, and thus what 
constitutes self interest, is not defined in isolation.  But knowledge of one’s 
preferences is not questioned. 
2.2   Preference Formation 
Bowles (1998) argues forcefully that preferences are not innate but are rather 
endogenous. What individuals’ preferences are, how they evaluate choices, 
depend on the institutional structure of the world around them, the legal 
institutions, the economic institutions, and the cultural institutions of family, 
religion, and school which define their environment and provide them a 
framework in which to evaluate their experiences.  Changes in these institutions 
lead to changes in preferences and thus have effects beyond the narrow sphere in 
which the institution operates.  For example, market exchange may diminish the 
value of cultural traits such as trustworthiness and generosity, which while 
essential in situations of repeated non-anonymous exchange, are not in non-
repeated, anonymous exchange.  In a related analysis Bar-Gill and Fershtman 
(2004) show that laws change not only incentives to behave in specific, socially 
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approved, ways, they can also affect preferences.  Specifically, they show that a 
preference for fairness can be undermined by a law which provides a strong 
remedy for breach of contract.   
Palacios-Huerta and Santos (2004) develop a model in which individuals interact 
in an incomplete market setting.  The incompleteness of the market and their 
patterns of interaction endogenously determine their degree of risk aversion, the 
key preference parameter in this analysis.  Bisin and Verdier (2000) and Bisin, et 
al. (2006) model the transmission of cultural preferences from parents to children, 
thereby establishing how minority cultures survive the forces of assimilation by 
the majority culture.  While parents may try to define who their child becomes by 
controlling their environment, restricting their experiences, and providing the lens 
though which those experiences are interpreted, the media can also give greater 
definition to and suggest societal norms for emergent identities, such as that of the 
working woman analyzed by Starr (2004).  Internal forces are also at work in 
enabling the individual to become who he wants to be.  These forces are studied 
by George (1998, 2007) in which individuals take actions to constrain their choice 
sets and which allows them to be true to their preferred preferences.    
These papers on endogenous preference formation stress the role of the 
individual’s environment, whether familial, ethnic, social, economic or legal in 
defining his preferences, that is who and why he is as he is.  Identity theory 
provides context since it looks at the whole individual and what he aspires to be 
and shows how the ideal set of preferences, those of the archetype, are adopted.  
We draw these two literatures together and examine how an individual is defined, 
how he tries to redefine himself, and is redefined by his actions and events beyond 
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his control.  We will question whether full knowledge of his preferences, even at a 
point in time, is achieved or achievable, and then consider whether and how this 
matters for the assessment of decision making and, more importantly, of 
wellbeing, the value of life. 
3   The Model  
This model is inspired by Pecchenino (2009) and Jeitschko, O’Connell and 
Pecchenino (2007).  Individuals live for two periods.  At birth each individual is 
endowed with an essence and initial emotional, psychological, spiritual, 
intellectual, and economic resources.  An individual’s essence can be interpreted 
as a preference ordering defined over N distinct yet interdependent identities in 
both the first and second periods of his life.  At birth the individual has no 
knowledge of his preferences or the extent of his resources and only discerns 
them, perhaps inaccurately and incompletely, through experience.   
An individual is born into an environment defined by his family or guardians, his 
ethnic or cultural group, where he lives and the political, economic, legal, 
religious, educational, informational and other institutions that characterize his 
community or nation.  Experience, the interaction of the individual with his 
environment, leads to some identities being discerned (the individual ‘discovers’ 
who he is), and others remaining latent.  Experience also enables the individual to 
learn about the resources in his control.  Once a set of identities is discerned, and 
incorporated into a composite identity, the individual chooses the identity ideal or 
archetype to which he will aspire for each component identity.  The individual 
chooses his ideals from the set of archetypes he perceives.  His perceptions are a 
function of his environment, experience and resources.   
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Having chosen his identity archetypes, and given his perceived current and 
expected and hoped for future resources, the agent invests effort today and plans 
to invest effort tomorrow in his identities.  These identities define who the 
individual believes himself to be today.  He also invests today in identity specific 
behaviours and skills that prepare him to take on additional expected or hoped for 
identities to achieve what he now believes to be his lifetime ideal composite 
identity.  This defines who he wants to become.  These investments can augment 
or diminish his future resources by enhancing or, unintentionally, reducing his 
overall ability to achieve the identities that are now desired and those that may 
actually be discerned in the future.  Two forces are at work in determining his 
current actions and plans for the future:  his life’s course.  Mathematical 
expectations of the future that are based on an objective evaluation of what is 
likely to occur, and hopes for the future that are not based on an objective 
evaluation, yet motivate current choices1 (Sharot, et al. 2007).  One’s expectations 
and hopes, however, may not be realized and may be based on achieving identities 
that while discerned are not consistent with his essence.  Individuals, no matter 
how much they try to be otherwise, are constrained by their essences. 
Assume that an individual’s composite identity and the effort, his psychological, 
emotional, spiritual and physical resources expended, required to attain it are 
related both temporally and intertemporally.  The individual believes that he can 
harness his resources to approach or attain his composite identity ideal.  These 
personal beliefs over resources expended can depend on context, the personal, 
familial, social, intellectual and spiritual environment in which the individual 
                                                 
1 Sharot, et al., 2007, have found in neurobiological studies that “[H]umans expect positive events 
in the future even when there is no evidence to support such expectations.” And these expectations 
“motivate adaptive behaviour in the present towards a future goal.”   
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finds himself.  Intertemporal spillovers from actions taken today on the situation 
in which the individual finds himself in the future can be intentional or 
unintentional.  In either case they affect the individual’s initial position as he 
begins his second period of life.  
The initial identities an individual discerns and from which he builds his 
composite identity depend on environmental, familial, spiritual and societal 
factors.  They depend on how the individual’s essence interacts with his 
environment and the extent to which his environment imposes itself on the 
individual.  The identities an individual may discern in the future depend on the 
identities discerned today.  This discernment process can be affected by his 
investments in future identity capital which allows the agent to influence his 
lifetime identity composition.   But, his actions dedicated to achieving his current 
identity goals, his environment, his essence as well as factors beyond his control, 
those that can be anticipated in period 1 and affected by the individual’s actions 
and those unanticipated and unable to be anticipated in period 1 also affect which 
identities may be discerned in the future as well as future resource endowments.  
Finally, investments today in identity specific capital can leave the agent well or 
ill-prepared for a future in which these hoped for or expected identities are or are 
not realized.   
The individual, given his initial identity discernments, must choose his archetypes 
from the set he perceives and divide his total perceived resources in period 1 and plan 
to divide his expected total resources in period 2 to try to achieve his overall identity 
goals today given his aspirations for the future.  Given the individual’s understanding 
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of the interrelationships among his component identities (which together define the 
composite identity) his decisions will take these interrelationships into account.   
Thus, the individual plans for what he believes is, what he expects will be, and 
what he hopes will be.  He chooses his current resource allocation and his planned 
resource allocation for his hoped for and expected future.  These choices are made 
and current actions are taken in period 1.  These actions move him closer to his 
period 1 identity archetypes and prepare him for his now desired future.  These 
choices may reveal mis-discernments of his underlying preferences causing the 
individual to question who he is.  Then, at the onset of period two, events, both 
those that were anticipated and those that were not, are realized, which in 
conjunction with his first period identity discernments or now recognized mis-
discernments and his first period identity investments provide the basis upon 
which he discerns his second period identities.  At this juncture the relationship 
among his past and future identity perceptions is revealed.  To the extent that his 
period 2 identities are not what he had hoped for or imagined if hoped for or 
expected, the individual must come to terms with what he now perceives, in the 
knowledge that he had been wrong in the past and may be so again.  Further, to 
the extent that realizations of events that could not be anticipated can be 
considered life-altering, essentially creating a structural break, they displace some 
or all previous and hoped for or expected future identities, replace them with other 
identities, and thereby redefine who the individual now is and reinterpret who he 
then was.   They change his life 
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4   Implications 
In this model individuals take decisions based on partial, imperfect, and perhaps 
even wrong perceptions of who they are. That is, they do not know their own 
preferences they can only discern them.  The discernment process is life-long and 
may be fraught with error since only with the accumulation of experience may it 
be possible clearly to perceive one’s preferences, both current and past.  The 
decisions taken based on preferences as currently understood may be revealing to 
the individual, allowing him to learn what does not make him happy while not 
necessarily directing him towards what does.   Revealed preference theory would, 
mistakenly, tell us that the decisions and actions taken do reveal the individual’s 
underlying preferences, although at best they can reveal what the individual 
discerned his preferences to be.  Standard theory with its assumption of known 
preferences, would explain away any anomalies, such as time inconsistent 
behaviour, by asserting, for example, hyperbolic discounting.  Bounded rationality 
(Simon 1955), while it may be a factor, will not change that the individual does 
not necessarily know and thus does not necessarily act on his true preferences. 
Does this matter?  In the context of how and why choices are made it does not.  
Choices are made to obtain or to move toward an objective.  That the objective is 
ultimately shown not to be consistent with underlying preferences or who the 
individual determines himself to be does not alter the motive for the actions taken.  
It is in interpreting the outcome of choices taken in terms of utility or individual 
wellbeing where difficulties arise. 
Choices taken in this framework may actually be welfare diminishing, even if 
unintentionally so.  Welfare may be diminished because actions taken to achieve 
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an identity may be successful, but if this identity is determined not part of one’s 
essence, achievement of this identity goal will not bring satisfaction but instead 
may cause dislocation and distress.  Thus, decisions, even if they immediately or 
eventually lead to greater self-knowledge and higher future wellbeing, may be 
regretted.2  This is not just an issue of experience goods, credence goods, or 
positional goods that require experience with the good to determine its value.  It is 
that preferences discerned and then acted upon do not lead to the expected/hoped 
for outcome because those preferences, although discerned, were not the 
individual’s true preferences if this concept has any real meaning given that 
preferences can never be fully and decisively known, there is always still more to 
discover.   
Additional issues arise since resources are not precisely known.  Thus, choices 
taken may not be feasible, leading to failure to achieve or to be able to achieve 
what was planned, or they may be significantly inside the budget set if the 
perceived resources are significantly lower than they actually are.  This is, 
perhaps, not a major problem when the resource constraint is simply an income 
constraint, but when resources are defined more broadly to include, for example, 
physical, mental and spiritual resources, and when one’s actions today affect one’s 
resources tomorrow, it could be.   
5   Conclusion 
Economic analysis is underpinned by strong assumptions on what individuals 
know, what they do not know, and how they can learn what they do not know and 
                                                 
2 These feelings of regret are similar to those analyzed by regret theory (Bell, 1982, 1983; Loomes 
and Sugden, 1982), in that the outcome of decisions taken in the past are evaluated based on the 
outcomes of foregone alternatives, what might have or could have been.  Here, however, regret 
occurs as a result of finding out you are not who you thought you were. 
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then know that they know it.  Not knowing is usually reduced to knowing the 
distribution over all possible outcomes, and knowing what all possible outcomes 
are, but not knowing which will be realized.  There are very few unknown 
unknowns.  In this paper we have asked, in the context of an individual, what if 
there are many unknown unknowns that can be revealed only by the life lived, that 
is experience, where experience is the interaction of the individual today given his 
expectations of the future, well-founded or built on hopes and dreams, with his 
environment and exogenous events, both predictable and unpredictable.  Thus, the 
individual, through living, discerns his preferences, possibly suffering numerous 
setbacks where those preferences discerned turn out to be false or experiencing 
epiphanies through which some aspect of his true preferences can be, or is 
believed to be, discerned accurately.  The lack of knowledge by the individual of 
own preferences and resources, of who, fundamentally, he is and will be, implies 
that many choices made are made on the basis of what is perceived to be rather 
than what is, but choices can be made, a life can be lived.  Living, even if 
analytically reduced to a process of choosing in accordance with perceived 
preferences and resource constraints given one’s environment, one’s experiences, 
emotions and events, does not guarantee satisfaction, but rather just another step 
on the journey that is life.   
 14 
References 
Akerlof, G.A., Kranton, R.E., 2000. Economics and Identity. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 115, 715-753. 
 
Akerlof, G. A., and Kranton, R. E., 2005. Identity and the Economics of 
Organizations. Journal of Economic Perspectives. 19(1), 9-32. 
 
Bar-Gill, O., and Fershtman, C., 2004. Law and Preferences. Journal of Law, 
Economics and Organization 20(2), 331-52. 
 
Bazin,  D., Ballet, J., 2006. A basic model for multiple self. The Journal of Socio-
Economics 35, 1050–1060. 
 
Bell, D. E.,1982. Regret in decision making under uncertainty. Operations 
Research 30, 961–981. 
 
Bell, D. E., 1983. Risks premium for decision regret. Management Science 29, 
1156–1166. 
 
Bisin, A., and  Verdier, T., 2000, “Beyond the Melting Pot”: Cultural 
Transmission, Marriage, and the Evolution of Ethnic and Religious Traits, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(3), 955-988. 
 
Bisin, A., Patacchini, E., Verdier, T., and Zenou, Y., 2006. 'Bend It Like 
Beckham': Identity, Socialization And Assimilation. CEPR Discussion Paper 
5662.   
 
Bowles, S., 1998. Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of 
Markets and other Economic Institutions. Journal of Economic Literature 36, 75-
111. 
 
Clark, A.E.,  Oswald, A.J., 1998. Comparison-concave Utility and Following 
Behaviour in Social and Economic Settings. Journal of Public Economics 70, 133-
155.  
 
Davis, John B., 2006. Social identity strategies in recent economics. Journal of 
Economic Methodology 13(3), 371 – 390. 
 
Duesenberry, J., 1949, Income, Saving, and the Theory of Consumer Behavior. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Easterlin, R.A., 1974. Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot? Nations 
and Households in Economic Growth.  In:   David, P.A., Reder, M.W.  (Eds.). 
Essays in Honour of Moses Abramovitz. New York:  Academic Press, Inc., 89-
125.   
 
Frank, R., 1985. The Demand for Unobservable and Other Nonpositional Goods. 
American Economic Review 75, 101-116. 
 15 
 
George, D., 1998. Coping Rationally with Unpreferred Preferences. Eastern 
Economic Journal 24(2), 181-94. 
 
George, D., 2007. Freedom from Choice:  Reconsidering Sen’s Case for 
Maximizing Opportunities. In:  Montero, B., White, M.D. (Eds.). Economics and 
the Mind.  London and New York:  Routledge., 127-142. 
 
Horst,  U., Kirman, A., Teschl, M., 2006. Changing Identity: The Emergence of 
Social Groups. GREQAM Working Paper 2006-51. 
 
Jeitschko, T., O’Connell, S., Pecchenino, R., 2008. Identity, Collective Beliefs, 
and the Allocation of Resources. Economic and Social Review 39(1), 39-54. 
 
Kirman, A., Teschl, M., 2004. .On the Emergence of Economic Identity. Revue de 
Philosophique Économique 9(1), 59-86. 
 
Kirman A., Teschl, M., 2006. Searching for Identity in the Capability Space. 
Journal of Economic Methodology. 13(3), 299 – 325. 
 
Loewenstein, G., 2000, Emotions in Economic Theory and Economic Behavior. 
American Economic Review. 90(2), 426-32. 
 
Loomes, G.,  Sugden, R., 1982. Regret theory: An alternative theory of rational 
choice under uncertainty. The Economic Journal 92, 805–824. 
 
O’Donoghue, T., Rabin, M., 2001. Choice and Procrastination. Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 116, 121-60. 
 
Palacios-Huerta, I., and Santos, T., 2004. A theory of markets, institutions, and 
endogenous preferences. Journal of Public Economics 88, 601– 627. 
 
Parfit, D, 1971, Personal Identity. Philosophical Review 80(1) 3-27. 
 
Pecchenino, R., 2009. Becoming:  Identity and Spirituality. Journal of Socio-
Economics 38, 31-36. 
 
Schelling, T., 1985. Enforcing Rules on Oneself.  Journal of Law, Economics, & 
Organization 1(2), 357-74. 
 
Sharot, T., Riccardi, A., Raio, C., Phelps, E., 2007,  Neural mechanisms mediating 
optimism bias. NATURE 450, 102-106.  
 
Sen, A., 1977. Rational Fools:  A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of 
Economic Theory. Economica 40(159), 241-59. 
 
Sen, A., 1985. Goals, Commitment and Identity. Journal of Law, Economics & 
Organization 1(2), 341-55. 
 
Sen, A., 1997. Maximization and the Act of Choice. Econometrica 65(4), 745-79. 
 16 
 17 
 
Sen, A., 2002. Rationality and Freedom.  Cambridge, MA:  Belknap, Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Simon, H., 1955.  A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 69, 99-118. 
 
Starr, M., 2004. Consumption, Identity, and the Sociocultural Constitution of 
‘‘Preferences’’: Reading Women’s Magazines. Review of Social Economy. 62(3), 
291-305.   
 
Teschl, Miriam, 2006. Personal Identity Decisions for Examining Change. 
Working Paper, Robinson College, University of Cambridge, UK. 
 
 
 
